THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969:
CONSEQUENCES FOR PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS*
K.

MARTIN WORTHYt

INTRODUCTION

Most provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 which affect private foundations now have been in effect for seven years.' These provisions frequently
have been described as the most far-reaching legislation affecting private
philanthropy in our two hundred-year history.
Some supporters of the 1969 legislation regarded it as a means of transferring from the private to the public sector some of the social services which
in the past had been supported almost entirely, or at least significantly, by
private philanthropy.2 As the 1969 Act moved through the legislative process,
one less than enthusiastic Senator described one of its provisions as an obvious attempt "to cut off the dog's tail an inch at a time."' 3 Shortly after enactment, another contemporary commentator concluded, "[t]he bell may well
have faintly tolled for the private foundation; it is now to be found only in
captivity and there are strong doubts about its ability to reproduce."4 It is
perhaps now appropriate to take stock, to see whether, based on seven year's
experience, these original concerns have been borne out and whether changes
in some or all of the 1969 provisions are needed.
* This article is based in part on remarks made by the author at the Institute on Exempt
Organizations of the Southwestern Legal Foundation in Dallas, Texas, on January 16, 1975.
t Hamel, Park, McCabe & Saunders, Washington, D.C.; Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue
Service, 1969-72; Chairman, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, 1973-74.
1. Internal Revenue Code sections 170(b), 4940, 4942, 4943, and 4948, as added or amended
by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Act of December 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 533,
were first effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1969. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 170(b), 4940, 4942, 4943, 4948. Internal Revenue Code sections 507, 509, 4941, 4944, 4945,
4946, and 4947, as added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, first became effective January 1, 1970.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 507, 509, 4941, 4944-47. Internal Revenue Code sections 508(a), (b),
& (c), as added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, became effective October 9, 1969. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 508(a), (b), (c).
2. See, e.g., Norton, The Challenge for Creative Philanthropy, in PHILANTHROPY IN THE SEVENTIES
84 (1970); Creel, The Role of the Foundation in Today's Societv, in N.Y.U., 9TH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 2-3 (1969). See also M. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND

GOVERNMENT 49-53 (1965). For an earlier concern about this problem, see the interesting historical account in Liles & Blum, Development of the Federal Tax Treatment of Charities, 39 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. no. 4, at 6 (1975).
3.
115 CONG. REC. 37493 (1969) (remarks of Senator Curtis of Nebraska).
4. Taggart, The CharitableDeduction, 26 TAX L. REV. 63, 65 (1970).
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During the past two years, three important studies have become available
as to the actual impact during these seven years of the 1969 legislation on
charitable giving and private foundations in particular. The first of these is a
forty-two page report of a study conducted under sponsorship of the American Bar Foundation, entitled "The Impact of the Private Foundations Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969: Early Empirical Measurements," written
by John R. Labovitz, a research associate at the Brookings Institution.' The
second is a Report and Recommendations to the Commission on Private Philanthropy
and Public Needs on Private PhilanthropicFoundations, prepared by the chairman
and staff of the Council on Foundations, Incorporated, and released last
year.' Finally, there is the report by Chairman Vance Hartke of Indiana, issued October 1, 1974, on the activities, conclusions, and recommendations of
the Senate Finance Committee, Subcommittee on Foundations. 7 All three reports are based on extensive fact-finding: the American Bar Foundation's
Labovitz study, on an examination and comparison of information returns
(Form 990-A), on reports of a scientifically selected sample of 388 foundations throughout the country having assets ranging from a few thousand dollars to more than ten million dollars, on interviews with various foundation
officials, and on information derived from other published sources. The
Council on Foundations' report is based on a comprehensive questionnaire
sent by the Council to 2,248 foundations of various kinds and sizes, including
both Council members and non-members. Although there was only a 25 per
cent response to the Council's questionnaire, the results appear to be quite
meaningful. The Hartke Report is based largely on oral and written statements received by the Senate Subcommittee on Foundations from the Treasury Department and also on its hearings conducted October 1 and 2, 1973,
May 13 and 14, 1974, and June 3, 1974.8 In addition it relies to a lesser
extent on oral and written statements received by the Subcommittee on
Domestic Finance of the House Committee on Banking and Currency at hearings it held on April 5 and 6, 1973,1 and on statements received by the House
5. Labovitz, The Impact of the Private Foundations Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969: Early
Empirical Measurements, 3 J. LEGAL STUDIES 63 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Labovitz].
6. COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS, INC., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMM'N ON
PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS OF PRIVATE PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS (1975)
[hereinafter cited as COUNCIL REPORT].
7. 120 CONG. REC. 18313 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Hartke Report]. In
releasing the report, Senator Hartke noted that the "conclusions and recommendations in this
statement are my own and are concurred in by the other individual members of the subcommittee to the extent indicated herein." Id.
PRIVATE

8. Hearings on The Role of Private Foundations in Today's Society and a Review of theImpact of
CharitableProvisions of theTax Re/arm Act of 1969 on the Support and Operation of Private Foundations
Be/ore theSubcomm. on Foundations of"theSenate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.

(1973-74).
9. Hearings on Tax-Exempt Foundations and Charitable Trusts: Their Compliance with the Provisions
1969 Betore the Subcomm. on Domestic Finance oj theHouse Comm. on Banking and
of Tax Reform Act of"
Currency, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973).
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Ways and Means Committee at hearings it held on April 9 and 10, 1973.1"
There have, of course, been other published studies on the impact of the
1969 legislation,' but these three appear to contain far more factual data
than has heretofore been available.
I
COMPLEXITY-INCREASED COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION

First of all, there seems to be general agreement that the operating responsibilities imposed on private foundations of the new law and its complexities have resulted in a significant increase in administrative costs, particularly
in legal and accounting services which, according to the Labovitz survey,
roughly doubled between 1967 and 197012 and, according to the Council
Report, between 1968 and 1973.13 Total administrative expenses of the average foundation went tip 66 per cent from 1968 to 1973, according to the
Council Report. 4 Although the Council Report respondents indicated that only
about half of the increased administrative cost is attributable to the Tax Reform Act,1 5 clearly some of this additional cost of compliance undercuts a
stated objective of the Tax Reform Act-to require that a greater portion of
foundation assets be made available for current charitable purposes." None
of the reports suggests any solution for the problem of increased administrative costs; indeed, the Council Report suggests that many foundations continue
17
to be understaffed.
10. Hearings on General Tax Reform Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
11. See, e.g., Labovitz, 1969 Tax Reforms Reconsidered, in THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS 101 (F.
Hermann ed. 1973), a forerunner of the Labovitz study discussed here. Dressner, Learning to Live
With the Tax Rejorm Act, in TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, TAX IMPACTS ON PHILANTHROPY 121
(1972); J. WATSON, THE IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 ON COMPANY FOUNDATIONS
(1973).
12. Labovitz 78. In many instances the Labovitz figures are broken down by size of foundation: those with assets of less than $200,000; those withassets between $200,000 and $1,000,000;
those with assets between $1,000,000 and $10,000,000; and those with assets over $10,000,000.
For purposes of simplicity in presentation, the present author has relied in many instances on
weighted averages of the Labovitz figures based on the number of foundations in each size group
as shown in the Labovitz study. The weighted averages do not appear in the Labovitz study and
often the severity or degree (or sometimes even the direction) of change for foundations of one
size group is not the same as for foundations of another size group; nevertheless, the weighted
averages used herein are believed to be fairly representative of general indications of impact of
the 1969 Act.
13. COUNCIL REPORT 111-6, fig. 3. Certainly the experience of the author and other lawyers is
that the problems faced by private foundations are both far more numerous and far more sophisticated today than seven years ago.
14. COUNCIL REPORT 111-6, fig. 4.
15. COUNCIL REPORT 111-6, 111-7.
16. See the discussion of Internal Revenue Code sections 4942 and 4944 in the Finance
Committee Report on the 1969 Act, S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 35, 45, 46 (1969). See
also Hartke Report (discussion of the effect of increased costs on foundation recipients).
17. COUNCIL REPORT 111-7, 111-8.
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Something can-and should-be done about the undue cornplexity of the

Act. First, many of the arbitrary rules, such as those in sections 170,"8 509,19

18. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 170(b)(l)(A)(vii), (b)(l)(E)(iii). These provisions permit a deduction to qualify for the 50 per cent limitation instead of the usual 20 per cent limitation applicable to private foundations, in the case of:
(iii) a private foundation all of the contributions to which are pooled in a common
fund and which would be described in section 509(a)(3) but for the right of any substantial contributor (hereafter in this clause called "donor") or his spouse to designate annually the recipients, from among organizations described in paragraph (1) of section
509(a), of the income attributable to the donor's contribution to the fund and to direct
(by deed or by wvill) the payment, to an organization described in such paragraph (1), of
the corpus in the common fund attribttable to the donor's colltiribution; but this clause
shall apply only if all of the income of the common fund is required to be (and is) distributed to one or more organizations described in such paragraph (1) not later than the
15th day of the third month after the close of the taxable year in which the income is realized by the fund and only if all of the corpus attributable to any donor's contribution to
the fund is required to be (and is) distributed to one or more of such organizations not
later than one year after his death or after the death of his surviving spouse if she has the
right to designate the recipients of sLich corpus.
Also see the half-page special limitation in IN r. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(b)(l)(D), permitting a
deduction of ill) to 30 per cent-instead of 20 per cent for most gifts to some charities (including
most private foundations) as provided in § 170(b)(1)(B), 50 per cent for most gifts to other
charities (including somne private foundations) as provided in § 170(b)(1)(A), or 100 per cent as
provided in some circumstances in § 170(b)(1)(C)-for contributions of certain capital gains property, subject to the following election:
(iii) At the election of the taxpayer (made at such time and in such manner as tile
Secretary or his delegate prescribed by regulations), subsection (e)(l) shall apply to all
contributions of capital gain property (to which subsection (e)(1)(B) does not otherwise
apply) made by the taxpayer during the taxable year. If such an election is made, clauses
(i) and (ii) shall not apply to contributions of capital gain property made during the
taxable year, and in applying subsection (d)(l) for such taxable year with respect to
contributions of capital gain property made in any prior contribution year for which an
election was not made under this clause, such contributions shall be redtuced as if subsection (e)(1) had applied to such contributions in the year in which made.
19. See, e.g., INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 509(a). This provision defines a private foundation as
any organization described in section 501(c)(3), other than, among other things:
(2) an organization which(A) normally receives more than one-third of its support in each taxable year from
any combination of(i) gifts, grants, contributions, or membership fees, and
(ii) gross receipts from admissions, sales of merchandise, performance of services,
or furnishing of facilities, in an activity which is not unrelated trade or business
(within the meaning of section 513), not including such receipts from any person, or from any bureau or similar agency of a governmental unit (as described
in section 170(c)(1)), in any taxable year to the extent such receipts exceed the
greater of $5,000 or 1 percent of the organization's support in such taxable year,
from persons other than disqualified persons (as defined in section 4946) with
respect to the organization, from governmental units described in section
170(c)(1), or from organizations described in section 170(b)(I)(A) (other than in
clauses (vii) and (viii)), and
(B) normally receives not more than one-third of its support in each taxable year
from gross investment income (as defined in subsection (e)).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 509(a)(2).
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642, 664,4) and 494321 need to be eliminated.2 2 Second, some of the esoteric
20. See, e.g., the definitions of "pooled income funds," "charitable remainder annuity trusts,"
and "charity remainder unitrusts"-the only types of trust now qualified under Internal Revenue
Code section 170(f)(2) to receive deductible contributions in trust-as defined in sections
642(c)(5) and 664(d), as follows:
(5) DEFINITION OF POOLED INCOME FUND.-For purposes of paragraph (3), a
pooled income fund is a trust(A) to which each donor transfers property, contributing an irrevocable remainder
interest in such property to or for the use of an organization described in section
170(b)(I)(A) (other than in clauses (vii) or (viii)), and retaining an income interest for
life of one or more beneficiaries (living at the time of such transfer).
(B) in which the property transfer by each donor is commingled with property
transferred by other donors who have made or make similar transfers,
(C) which cannot have investments in securities which are exempt from the taxes
imposed by this subtitle,
(D) which includes only amounts received from transfers which meet the requirements of this paragraph,
(E) which is maintained by the organization to which the remainder interest is contributed and of which no donor or beneficiary of an income interest is a trustee, and
(F) from which each beneficiary of an income interest receives income, for each year
for which he is entitled to receive the income interest referred to in subparagraph
(A), determined by the rate of return earned by the trust for such year.
For purposes of determining the amount of any charitable contribution allowable by
reason of a transfer of property to a pooled fund, the value of the income interest shall
be determined on the basis of the highest rate of return earned by the fund for any of
the 3 taxable years immediately preceding the taxable year of the fund in which the
transfer is made. In the case of funds in existence less than 3 taxable years preceding the
taxable year of the fund in which a transfer is made, the rate of return shall be deemed
to be 6 percent per annum, except that the Secretary or his delegate may prescribe a
different rate of return.
INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, § 642(c)(5).

(d) DEFINITIONS.(1) CHARITABLE REMAINDER ANNUITY TRUST.For purposes of this section, a charitable remainder annuity trust is a trust(A) from which a sum certain (which is not less than 5 percent of the initial net fair
market value of all property placed in trust) is to be paid, not less often than annually, to one or more persons (at least one of which is not an organization described
in section 170(c) and, in the case of individuals, only to an individual who is living at
the time of the creation of the trust) for a term of years (not in excess of 20 years)
or for the life or lives of such individual or individuals,
(B) from which no amount other than the payments described in subparagraph (A)
may be paid to or for the use of any person other than an organization described in
section 170(c), and
(C) following the termination of the payments described in subparagraph (A), the
remainder interest in the trust is to be transferred to, or for the use of, an organization described in section 170(c) or is to be retained by the trust for such a use.
(2) CHARITABLE REMAINDER UNITRUST.-For purposes of this section, a charitable remainder unitrust is a trust(A) from which a fixed percentage (which is not less than 5 percent) of the net fair
market value of its assets, valued annually, is to be paid, not less often than annually, to one or more persons (at least one of which is not an organization described
in section 170(c) and, in the case of individuals, only to an individual who is living at
the time of the creation of the trust) for a term of years (not in excess of 20 years)
or for the life or lives of such individual or individuals,
(B) from which no amount other than the payments described in subparagraph (A)
may be paid to or for the use of any person other than an organization described in
section 170(c), and
(C) following the termination of the payments described in subparagraph (A), the
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concepts, such as whether an organizaton is "operated, supervised or con-

trolled by or in connection with" a publicly supported organization within the
meaning of section 509(A)(3), and the "responsiveness" and "attentiveness"
tests added as a gloss thereon by the regulations, 23 need to be clarified or
eliminated.2 4 Finally, the basic philosophy that every possible "loophole"
ought to be closed, however minimal the abuse by a few clever opportunists
and however burdensome compliance by the many real philanthropists,
should be changed.
II
DISTRIBUTION REQUIREMENTS

A.

Minimum Rate of Return

Turning to specific provisions applicable to private foundations, both the
Labovitz study and the Council Report indicate that non-operating foundations
remainder interest in the trust is to be transferred to, or for the use of, an organization described in section 170(c) or is to be retained by the trust for such a use.
(3) EXCEPTION.- Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (2)(A) and (B), the
trust instrument may provide that the trustee shall pay the income beneficiary for any
year(A) the amount of the trust income, if such amount is less than the amount required
to be distributed under paragraph (2)(A), and
(B) any amount of the trust income which is in excess of the amount required to be
distributed under paragraph (2)(A), to the extent that (by reason of subparagraph
(A)) the aggregate of the amounts paid in prior years was less than the aggregate of
such required amounts.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 664(d).
21. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4943. These rules-and the transitional provisions of section
101(1)(4) of the 1969 Act which accompanied them-are much too complex to be set out, or even
summarized here, but their frequent reference to 20 per cent holdings in some circumstances, 35
per cent in others, 50 per cent in others, 75 per cent in others, and 95 per cent in others-with
the applicablity of such percentages dependent in some cases upon another 2 per cent or 15 per
cent holding; to five-year, ten-year, fifteen-year, and twenty-year periods in different circumstances; and to different rules dependent upon circumstances on May 26, 1969, or January 1,
1971, are illustrative of the difficulties and the differences in result which ensue dependent upon
slight differences in fact.
22. The list of sections referred to is not exhaustive, but merely illustrative of the problem.
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4 (1972). No section caused greater difficulties than section
509(a)(3) in the drafting of regulations while the author was in the government. The problem of
reconsidering the language, concepts, and legislative history of sections 170(b)(1)(vi), as it was
added in 1964 and the regulations promulgated thereunder, with the similar language, but varying concepts and legislative history of section 170(b)(1)(iv), and section 509(a)(3) of the 1969 Act,
posed an extremely difficult challenge to those charged with drafting the regulations under the
1969 Act.
24. The author was advised in a case by the ruling authorities at the Internal Revenue Service
that if three publicly supported organizations depend for more than 25 per cent of their support
on one foundation-more in every instance than any other single source-the Service will not
consider the three public charities, in the absence of some greater dependency or control, to be
sufficiently "attentive" to affairs of the foundation to meet the "attentiveness" rule of the "integral part" test set out in Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(iii)(b) (1972). It is submitted that any
charity which is indifferent to such a foundation under such circumstances either ought to have
its trustees and management changed or its support cut off.
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generally are confronted with very serious problems in meeting the requirement of section 4942, which became fully effective in 1975. Under such provision, such foundations must distribute for charitable purposes an amount
equal to adjusted net income for the year or a specified percentage minimum
return on investment assets. 2" The minimum return was originally fixed by
Congress at six per cent for the year 1970, subject to adjustment each year by
the Treasury Department based on the same relationship to current "money
rates" and "investment yields" as six per cent bore to existing "money rates"
and "investment yields" in 1969.26 New foundations were required to meet
the minimum return requirements immediately, but foundations in existence
prior to 1969 were not required to meet the minimum return requirements at
all in 1970 and 1971 and were required to meet only three-fourths of the full
requirement in 1972, five-sixths in 1973, and eleven-twelfths in 1974.27
Legislative history indicates that the six per cent minimum return was
based on the assumption that foundations should be able to earn an average
return of at least eight per cent on their investment, and that if the amount
were fixed at six per cent they would be able to set aside two per cent each
year to maintain the purchasing power of their assets, two per cent representing the approximate rate of inflation over the preceding ten years.28 The
Labovitz study shows that in 1967 roughly a third of the foundations earned
less than six per cent on their investments and that in 1970 over half of the
foundations earned less than a six per cent return. 29 Although less precise,
the Council Report indicates that-despite the fact that a great many of the
responding foundations changed their investment practices after enactment of
the 1969 Act 3S°-53 per cent still failed to attain the minimum return in
1973.31
25. Although it will not lose its status as an exempt organization for ordinary tax purposes, a
non-operating foundation, in the event of failure to pay out the amount required, is subject to an
initial tax of 15 per cent on the amount undistributed at the beginning of the succeeding taxable
year and an additional tax of 100 per cent on the amount still undistributed within a "correction
period" (normally 90 days after notice by the Commissioner). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4942.
26. Id. § 4942(e).
27. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(1)(3), 83 Stat. 534.
28. See Hearings on H.R. 13270 Belore the Senate Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6170
(1969); 115 CONG. REC. S15956 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1969); H.R. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
281 (1969). See also COMMISSION ON FOUNDATIONS AND PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY, FOUNDATIONS,
PRIVATE GIVING AND PUBLIC POLICY 147-49 (1970).
29. Labovitz 88-90. In a letter to Senator Vance Harke, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
Frederic Hickman acknowledged that during the years 1970 to 1974 the "minimum pay-out reqlirement has exceeded average dividend yields (for the years 1969 to 1973) by 2.3 percent."
Secretary Hickman noted that "a private foundation investing in low dividend securities . . .
might make minimal charitable contributions and exist primarily as a vehicle for wealth accumulation" through retention of corporate earnings not distributed as dividends and suggested that
Congress accordingly deliberately "set the minimtum distribution requirement at a rate substantially above average dividend yields." Letter from Frederic Hickman to Vance Hartke, Nov. 22,
1974.
30. COUNCIL REPORT 111-13, example 4.
31. Id.
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Many foundations, of course, even prior to the 1969 Act, paid out more
than current income, often passing on current gifts received instead of adding
them to corpus. The Labovitz study shows, however, that in 1967, 56 per cent
of the foundations paid out less than would then have been required "if the
distribution requirement, with a 6% minimum investment return, had been in
effect." 2 The record was even worse in 1970.33 The study also indicates that
foundations with assets of less than two hundred thousand dollars would have
had to increase their payout 4.7 per cent in order to meet the distribution
requirement; those with assets between two hundred thousand dollars and
one million dollars, 9.5 per cent; those with assets between one million dollars
and ten million dollars, 17.1 per cent; and those with assets of ten million
dollars, a whopping 57.8 per cent. 34 It is true that some of these foundations
would have been able to meet the payout requirements by "setting aside" additional amounts for specific projects qualifying as constructive distributions
under section 45 4 2(g), but since such amounts must be paid out in any event
within five years, this would have been only a temporary solution. The fact is
that these figures clearly suggest that many foundations, as a result of the
1969 legislation, must increase their payout and, in order to do so, must
either significantly increase their investment return or else erode capital. It
should be noted, however, that if investment policy has deliberately sought
less current income in order to achieve growth in value of the investments,
the required distribution may do no more than force the distribution of what
would otherwise be unrealized appreciation in value, which, it may be argued,
is income in the economic sense.
The Council Report indicates that 75 per cent of the foundations answering
its questionnaire have, in fact, increased their payouts from 1969 to 1974; s" it
also reports-based on information compiled from other sources-that foundation distributions rose 5.4 per cent in 1970, 8 per cent in 1971, and 7.3
per cent in 1972.36 Even so, such increases are not enough since the report
also shows that the actual payout rate for non-operating foundations in 1973
averaged only 5.6 per cent 3 7 -still less than the minimum required for every
foundation in 1975.38
To meet this problem, the Council Report shows that 39 per cent of their
respondents have "revised their [investment] practices since 1969" as a result
of the 1969 Act, and well over half the revisions reported were intended to

32. Labovitz 91-92.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. COUNCIL REPORT 111-12, 111-13, fig. 8.
36. AMERICAN ASS'N OF FUND RAISING COUNSEL, GIVING U.S.A.:
o
& 1973).
37. Cf. COUNCIL REPORT fig. 1, fig. 2. See also id. at table 1.
38.

See text at note 51 infra.

ANNUAL REPORTS

(1971, 1972,
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increase yields. 39 Labovitz reports that many foundations have shifted to a
policy of finding investments with a high enough current yield to meet the six
per cent return and have abandoned emphasis on long-term performance,
even though many foundations appear to differ with Congress on whether
this is in the ultimate interest of the charities they benefit, believing that high
fixed yield investments rarely give adequate protection against inflation. 4 On
the other hand, critics might suggest that the foundations may have better
protected themselves against inflation in the past by use of fixed income investments (which generally produce high current yields) instead of speculative
growth stocks. The Council's report shows, for example, that thirty large and
middle-size foundations suffered a 26 per cent decline in the value of their
assets in a 8 month period in 1973.41
The Council Report also indicates that foundations may have been more
willing to shift investment policy had capital gains not been subject to the four
43
per cent tax on investment income 4'-a subject discussed below.
The alternative to changing investment policy to produce a high current
yield-invading corpus-is, of course, abhorrent to old-fashioned businessmen
and many foundation managers seeking to build their endowment at the expense of current spending. A shrinking endowment may have been just the
result desired by many of those sponsoring the 1969 legislation, particularly
those who think that all foundations should have a limited life. 44 Old
fashioned or not, it would seem apparent that if capital currently set aside to
produce income for charity is dissipated over a period of time and the
amount of new capital is also reduced-as evidence referred to later further
indicates 45-the total contribution of private philanthropy to society will steadily diminish.
B.

Possible Solutions

Several suggestions to solve the plight of the foundations have evolved.
The most obvious, and the one most often mentioned, is simply to reduce the
required minimum distribution. The Hartke Report concludes, however, that
"While some foundations support a reduction in the applicable percentage
from 6 to 5 percent . . . there is no evidence that the 5 percent rate is a
39.
40.

COUNCIL REPORT 111-13, example 4.

Labovitz 87-88. See also

COUNCIL REPORT

111-14.

41.
COUNCIL REPORT 114, quoting from AMERICAN ASS'N OF FUND RAISING COUNSEL, GIVING
U.S.A.: ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1974).

42. COUNCIL REPORT 111-5.
43. See text at note 69 i?/ra.
44. The Senate Finance Committee recommended, when the 1969 legislation was being considered, that private non-operating foundations be limited to a forty-year life, but this was rejected by the Senate. See 115 CONG. REC. S15956-963 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1969); S.REP. No. 552,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1969).
45. See text at notes 98 & 99 i/nra.
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proper one, or that it would not require an invasion of foundation corpus."' 4 3

The report goes on to say that there is no hard "statistical data about the
actual rates of return achieved by all classes of investors over long stretches of
time," and that until such information is available, Congress is not preparedl
to act.4 7 The Council Report, on the other hand, contains data from four
sources-one a highly respected study by the University of Chicago-which
show that the average rate of return to all investors in common stocks over
long periods of time, forty years or more, has averaged something under five
per cent, after taking into account changes in values of the stocks themselves
an( the effect of inflation thereon.4" This suggests that the assumption of
Congress that foundations should e'xpect a normal rate of return of eight per
cent or more and be able to distribute six per cent and have two per cent left
to offset the effect of inflation is simply unsound, particularly in light of our
4
recent experience with double-digit inflation. 9
The Hartke Report does propose that in exercising its authority to adjust
the six per cent yield fixed by the statute for changes in "money rates" and
"investment yields" since 1969, the Treasury has relied entirely too much on
interest rates and not enough on overall investment yield .5 The Treasury has
already indicated that the rate will be adjusted upward this year to seven per
cent. 5 ' Both the Hartke Report and the Council Report further suggest that the
rate of return should be fixed on the basis of experience over a much longer
period of time than one yearY.' The author further submits that, considering
the volatility of the market and also the need for foundations to have some
flexibility in accumulating funds when current program demands appear less
imp3ortant than likely later demands, foundations should be permitted a five
or ten-year period in which to average out the fulfillment of the distribution
recquirement. It is true that an amount set aside for a specific charitable purpose may be treated as a current contribution under section 4942(g)(2), if the
Commissioner is satisfied in advance that "(A) the amount will be paid for the
specific project within 5 years, and (B) the project is one which can be better
46.
47.

Hartke Report 18317.
Id.

48.

COUNCIL REPORT 111-15.

49. -fen and two-tenths per cent in 1974, according to the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 17, 1975,
at 2, col. 2.
50. Hartke Report 18317. In a letter to Senator Vance Hartke, Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury Frederic Hickman defended the Treasury practice of relying in 1973 and 1974 solely
on "change in yield on 5-year Treasury securities,"' on the grounds that they are more representative of "enduring investments in investment yields" than dividends. He also contended that
dividends are not a true measure of investment return because they ignore increases in value
resulting frot retained earnings, see note 29 supra, but showed that in any event the payout
requirement relative to 1969 would have been higher if dividends had been taken into account.
Letter front Frederic Hickman to Vance Hartke, Nov. 22, 1974.
51. Id.
52. Hartke Report 18317; CouNci. REPORT VI-9.
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accomplished by such set aside than by immediate payment of funds., '53 This
does give some flexibility, but it does not furnish any solution at all to the
situation where there simply is nothing in being or yet advanced beyond the
planning stage which is likely to be as meritorious as something which may
come into being or develop beyond the planning stage within the next several
years. The present law compels a distribution (or set-aside) for which the
foundation may have little enthusiasm at the expense of more worthwhile
projects which may come later. The 1969 Act contains a carryover provision
under which foundations making distributions in excess of the minimum requirements may apply such excess against distribution requirements in the
future;1 4 there should be a carryback provision over a limited period of time
as well.
III
OTHER INVESTMENT PROBLEMS

A.

Controlled Businesses

None of the three reports contains any information with respect to the
impact of the prohibition on investments which jeopardize exempt purposes
contained in section 4944." There is evidence, however, in both the Labovitz
study and the Council Report that the prohibition in section 4943 on the ownership of more than 20 per cent of the stock of a single business will, in due
course, have a substantial impact on many foundations. 6 In most instances
foundations have ten years to dispose of their excess holdings57 and in some
instances an even 'longer period, 58 so that for those who wish to delay, this
section has had no immediate effect other than on planning for the future.
The Labovitz study found that in 1967, although only relatively few foundations with assets of less than one million dollars ever held five per cent of the
stock of a single business, more than half of those with assets over one million
dollars held at least 25 per cent of the stock of a single business.5 9 The Council
Report shows that by 1973, 13 per cent of the foundations responding still
held 20 per cent or more of the stock of a single business,"i which suggests

53.

I'NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §

49 4 2

2

(g)( ).

54. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4942(i).
55. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4944.
56. Although the foundation having excess business holdings will not lose its exemption for
regular tax purposes, it will be subject to an initial tax of five per cent on the value of such
holdings and an additional 200 per cent tax if they are not disposed of within a "correction
period" (ordinarily ninety days after notice by the Commissioner).
57. A five-year period applies in the case of certain holdings acquired after May 26, 1969.
INT. REV, CODE OF 1954, § 4943(c)(5).
58. See note 21 supra.

59.

Labovitz 97.

60.

COUNCIL REPORT 111-19 & example 9.

TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969

Page 232: Autumn 1975]

that there has been some diversification of holdings in the interim. The
Labovitz study shows that for many foundations these holdings may constitute
over half of their total assets." Although the size of the foundations having
such holdings is not shown, the Council Report shows the average value of such
holdings to be over eighteen million dollars." Divestiture of holdings of such
magnitude will obviously pose a major problem for many foundations, but,
surprisingly, less than half of those foundations with the problem which responded to the Council questionnaire indicated that they had yet made ally
63
plans for meeting the requirements of the statute. One problem is that often
the most logical person to acquire such excess holdings is the creator of the
foundation, or some other disqualified person. Although the 1969 Act permits an "arm's length" sale of such holdings acquired before 1969,"' the Coin,cil Report notes that there is a need for a procedure to obtain an advance
ruling on whether a particular divestiture to a disqualified person will be col5
sidered arm's length by the Internal Revenue Service" The Coutcil Report
further notes that one problem confronted by many foundations is the possibility that the acquisition of stock by some disqualified person collaterally related to the foundation may be attributed to the foundation even though it
has no knowledge of such acquisition, and the person actually acquiring such
stock may not even know of the existence of the foundation."' Congressman
Patman introduced legislation in the last Congress to shorten the divestiture
period to five years," 7 but the Council Report suggests that this is entirely too
short, and that in fact, the current five year divestiture period for foundations
coming into existence after 1969 should be extended to at least ten years."
Both reports also note that many foundations have been deterred from an
early divestiture of their excess business holdings by reason of the fact that
any gain (representing appreciation in value subsequent to December 31,
1969) on such divestiture will be subject to the four per cent tax now imposed
on investment income."9 It would certainly seem appropriate to eliminate the
tax on gains resulting from divestitures required by the law, if not on capital
gains entirely. This problem, however, may have largely disappeared for most
foundations during the years 1973 and 1974 when stock prices generally declined below their values on December 31, 1969.

61.

Labovitz 97.

62.

63.

COUNCIL REPORT fig. 9.
COUNCIL REPORT 111-19,

64.
65.

Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(1)(2)(B), 83 Stat. 533.
COuNcIL REPORT VI-13.

111-20.

66. Id.
67. H.R. REP. No. 5729, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
68. COUNCIL REPORT V1-12, VI-14.
69.

I ahovit7 96. See also CouNciL REPORT 111-5. VI-8.
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Adequacy of Other Restrictions

It is submitted that the enactment of section 4943 was all over reaction to
a supposed abuse by a few foundations. It is true that there is evidence in
both the Labovitz and the Council reports that foundations having sizeable
holdings in a single business have experienced a lower rate of return on their
total investment assets than foundations not having such holdings.7 1 If such
holdings are not sound foundation investments, there is adequate encouragement to dispose of them in the minimum rate of return provisions of
section 4942 and speculative investment prohibitions of section 4944. It is said
that a loophole once existed allowing a settlor to insure continued domination
of a family business through the device of transferring control to a private
foundation which was controlled by members of his family, thus having such
stock escape estate tax at his death and also obtaining sizeable income tax
advantage during his lifetime . 7 1 It is suggested that everything else being
equal, the best investment is the one controlled by the investor, and that more
often than not, a business with which the settlor has long years of experience
will be worth much more to the foundation than some business with which
neither it nor he has any familiarity. The abuse argument usually overlooks
the permanent economic benefit to charity which the settlor has put beyond
his reach by transferring control of the business to a foundation, even though
sometimes in the past the economic benefit did not flow to charity for many
years to come. 72 The minimum distribution requirements of section 4942
should now be adequate to assure such benefits in the future, without requiring disposition of the business.73 It is also sometimes said that a foundation
controlled business has a competitive advantage over other business. Again, it
seems that the antitrust laws and the minimum investment return requirement are adequate to take care of such problems. This is not to say that every
foundation management should be saddled with the control of an operating
business, and there would certainly be merit in a requirement that every
foundation charter authorize its trustees to dispose of any of its assets when
deemed in the best interest of the foundation to do so, regardless of the
terms under which such assets were received, but to require disposition of a
controlled business even though the minimum return requirements of section
4942 and the speculative investment prohibition of section 4944 are not
violated-as is now required by section 4943-seems not only unnecessary,
but often not in the interest of the affected foundations.

70.

Labovitz 96-98; cf. COUNCIL REPORT figs. 9, 10.

71.
72.
73.

See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 35, 39 (1969).
Id. at 39.
Id.
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IV
SELF-DEALING PROHIBITION

The self-dealing prohibitions of section 4941 have apparently had less
measurable impact on private foundations than some of the other provisions
of the 1969 Act.74 The observation is frequently made, however, that the
prohibition on transactions between the foundation and related parties applies, without regard as to whether the foundation would be better off as a
result of the transaction. 5 While the difficulty the Service had in enforcing
the law prior to 1969, when only transactions not conducted at "arm's length"
were prohibited, 7" is understandable, there are frequently occasions when a
foundation's interest can best be served by dealing with a creator, donor, or
some other related person. An instance is recalled when a foundation client
desperately needed funds which its creator would have been willing to loan at
four per cent, but because of the self-dealing prohibitions, the foundation had
to turn to a local bank where the best it could do was six per cent. The
arguments for such a flat prohibition are not convincing. The Council Report
suggests that where a foundation is able to lemonstrate in advance to the
satisfaction of the Commissioner that a transaction, otherwise prohibited, is in
the foundation's best interest, it should be able to get an advance ruling permitting it to go ahead with the transaction.7 7 While the Commissioner is ordinarily reluctant to rule on such questions of fact, there is no more reason why
he could not rule in such a situation than where he is required to (1O SO under
other sections-such as section 4942(a)(2), upon showing of "good cause," and
section 367(a), upon showing of the absence of a tax avoidance purpose.
V
GRANT RESTRICTIONS

The restrictions of section 4945 on grants to indlividuals and non-public
charities have clearly reduced the anounts of such grants being made by

foundations. 78 The Council Report shows that whereas 39 per cent of the
74. The commission of an act of self-dealing will not restlt in loss of exemption for ordinary
tax porposes, but in the imposition of a five per cent initial tax (on the amount involved) on the
"disqualified person' engaged in such act of self-dealing with the foundation and a 21/. per cent
initial tax on any -foundation manager- (as defined) who knowingly entered into so, h act: if not
corrected within a "corirection period" (ordinarily ninety days after notice bv the Commissioner),
the "disqualified person" may be subject to an additional 200 pet cent tax and the "foundation
manager" to an additional 50 per cent tax. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 4941.
75. Labovitz 64: CouxcIL REPORT Il11-1.
76. INTi. R v. CODE OF 1954, ch. 1, § 503, 68A Stat. 166-67 (1954). prior to amendment by
the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
77.

COUNCIL REPORT VI-13.

78. The incurring of an "taxable expenditure" described in section 4945 will restil in the
imposition of a 10 per cent initial tax (on the amotint involved) on the foundation and a 2!/2 per
cent initial tax on any "foundation manager" (as defined) who knowingly agreed to such expenditure; if not corrected within a "correction period- (ordinaril ninety divs after notice by the
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foundations made such grants before 1969 under circumstances where a
foundation would be required to exercise "expenditure responsibility" under
the law today, only 20 per cent now make such grants.7" The Labovitz study
found that the paperwork required to see that the funds are expended for
the prescribed charitable purpose, to obtain complete financial reports from
the grantee and to submit detailed reports of such grants to the IRS, is simply
too burdensome for most foundations.8" It found on the other hand that
some foundations welcomed the requirement since it made it much easier to
turn down borderline requests."1 Labovitz found that "[W]hile there was some
concern among foundation administrators about the impact of the restrictions
on grants to individuals for travel, study, or similar purposes, few significant
alterations in foundation grant programs appeared to have resulted by
mid-1972."8 2 On the other hand, the Council Report found that whereas 32 per
cent of its responding foundations offered scholarship and similar grants
prior to the 1969 Act, only 19 per cent did so in 1974.83 Many organizations
have found particularly objectionable the present refusal of the Service to
grant permanent approval to any company foundation scholarship program
which grants scholarships to more than 25 per cent of the eligible applicants.8 4 Well-endowed foundations cannot reconcile themselves to the requirement of section 4942 that they pay out all of their income to carry out
their exempt purposes, with the refusal of the Service to permit them under
section 4945 to award scholarships except to every fourth applicant; and there
is almost certain to be some change in the Service's position on this matter in
the course of time. The Council Report also suggests that the expenditure responsibility requirement be lifted in the case of grants in any one year of less
8 5
than five thousand dollars to any one grantee.

Commissioner) the foundation may be subject to an additional 100 per cent tax and the "founda-

tion manager" to an additional 50 per cent tax. Proscribed is any expenditure:

(1) to carry on propaganda, or otherwise to attempt to influence legislation within the
meaning of subsection (e),

(2) except as provided in subsection (f), to influence the outcome of any specific public
election, or to carry on, directly or indirectly, any voter registration drive,
(3) as a grant to an individual for travel, study, or other similar purposes by such individual, unless such grant satisfied the requirements of subsection (g),

(4) as a grant to an organization (other than an organization described in paragraph (1),
(2), or (3) of section 509(a)), unless the private foundation exercises expenditure responsibility with respect to such grant in accordance with subsection (h), or
(5) for any purpose other than one specified in section 170(c)(2)(B).
INT. REV.

CODE

OF

1954,

79.
80.
81.
82.

COUNCIL REPORT

83.
84.
85.

COUNCIL

§ 4945(d).
111-18, 111-19, example 8.

Labovitz 82-84.
Labovitz 84-85.
Labovitz 85.
REPORT 111-17, example 7.
COUNCIL REPORT VI-15, VI-16.
COUNCIL REPORT VI-15.
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VI
REPORTING

The additional reporting requirements of the 1969 Act-both in terms of
furnishing additional information to the Internal Revenue Service and in
making available detailed financial information to the public-have caused
some additional work and expense to the foundations, but they do not seem
to be a cause for major complaint.88 It may be interesting to note, however,
that only 27 per cent of the foundations responding to the Council questionnaire were ever asked to see their annual financial report after notice of its
availability was published in accordance with the Act, and only five per cent
had requests from as many as twenty people to see their reports in 1973.87
VII
TAX ON INVESTMENT INCOME

The one feature of the 1969 Act which has drawn the most complaint and
the one on which there seems to be the greatest agreement as to need for a
change is the four per cent tax on investment income.88 Although justified in
part as a means of financing greater supervision of foundation activities
by the Internal Revenue Service, the total take from the tax in fiscal year
1974 alone was $76,617,000-or nearly half again as much as the aggregate
amount spent by the IRS in auditing and supervising foundations of
$53,200,000 in all seven fiscal years 1968 through 1974.89 The Hartke Report
states that the Senate Subcommittee on Foundations received a substantial
amount of testimony "that the money raised by this tax is money denied, not
to the private foundation, but to the charitable recipient of the foundation's
money"9 and concludes that "[t]he level of the excise tax should be reduced
from 4 to 2%."19 It anticipates that, because the tax is deductible for purposes
of the minjmun distribution requirements of section 4942, the saving to the
foundations will be passed on automatically to other charities.9 2 This will not
necessarily be so, however, in the case of those foundations which distribute
more than the minimum return, but, as previously indicated, they are in the
minority. 93 As indicated earlier, 94 the suggestion has been made that capital
gains should be excluded from the rate base, but the Hartke Report does not
direct itself to this problem. The Council Report also suggests that renewed

86.
87.

COUNCIL REPORT III-10.
COUNCIL REPORT III-10, fig. 7.

88. Labovitz 77. See also COUNCIL REPORT 1II-3, VI-8, example 2; Hartke Report.
89. Hartke Report 18314.
90. Id.
91. Hartke Report 18315.
92. Id.
93.
94.

See text at notes 32, 33, & 37 supra.
See text at note 69 supra.
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consideration be given to basing the fee on a percentage of investment assets,
rather than on a percentage of investment income, noting that the present
method tends to inhibit foundations from seeking to increase their investment
return. 9 5 The use of assets as a rate base was originally proposed in the
Senate when it was considering the 1969 legislation, but the Treasury successfully persuaded the Conference Committee to adopt the income base instead
of the asset base because of the greater simplicity of determining income than
asset value. 96 The Treasury's view has been borne out to some extent by the
finding of the Council Report that over 20 per cent of the responding foundations have experienced valuation difficulties in applying the minimum investment return rules of section 4942; 9 7 however, since experience now indicates
that nearly every foundation must value its assets in any event to comply with
section 4942, the Treasury's original objection to basing the section 4940 tax
on value of assets now seems to have less validity than before.
VIII
GIFTS

TO PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS

There seems to be little doubt that the amount of giving to foundations
has been considerably reduced as a result of the 1969 Act. The Labovitz study
shows that the number of foundations receiving contributions from all sources
declined roughly a quarter from 1967 to 1970, and that the average contribution received in 1970 was roughly half of the average contribution in 1967.98
These figures are not conclusive, because economic conditions were not as
good in 1970 as in 1967, but it is doubtful that the severity of the drop can be
attributed entirely to economic factors. In 1973-a better economic year
-- only 36 per cent of the foundations responding to the Council's questionnaire received contributions from any source, 99 as compared to 50 per cent in
1
1957 and 38 per cent in 1970, according to the Labovitz study. 0'0
The drop has apparently been most severe in the case of inter vivos gifts.
Whereas a Treasury study indicated that in 1962 foundations received more
than twice as much support from inter vivos gifts than from bequests,"" the
Council Report shows that in 1973 inter vivos gifts received by reporting foundations were less than half of bequests received. 1' 2 The Council Report suggests
that the decline in inter viros giving is attributable in part to the limitation on
95.

COUNCIL REPORT VI-8.

96. See the discussion in Hartke Report 18313.
97. COUNCIL REPORT 111-14, example 5.
98. Labovitz 99.
99.

100.

COUNCIL REPORT I1I-23c.

Labovitz 99.

101. TREASURY DEPARTMENT
(Comm. Print 1965).

102.

COUNCIL REPORT

111-23a.
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the amount that can be deducted under the 1969 Act for income tax purposes for gifts of appreciated property to private non-operating foundations; 13 the 20 per cent limit on deductions for gifts of all kinds to private
non-operating foundations, as compared to the 50 per cent limit for gifts to
public charities; 1' 4 and the fact that other prohibitions on private foundation
activity (such as the stock divestiture provision and the potential imposition of
excise taxes on foundation management)' 1 5 has generally made private foundations less attractive and a far more complex means of tax planning."16 The
last of these, of course, applies to testamentary as well as inter vivos gifts. It is
not entirely clear whether gifts which formerly would have been made to private foundations are now going directly to public charities." 7 The Council
Report indicates that total charitable giving in the United States increased from
$12,220,000,000 in 1965 to $24,530,000,000 in 1973 and that in each instance
approximately three-fourths of such gifts were inter vivos gifts of
individuals." 8 This is somewhat surprising in the light of the fact that some
restrictions were imposed in the 1969 Act on all charitable giving, such as the
limitation on deduction of property produced by the donor's own efforts""
and the requirement that gifts in trust be in the form of charitable remainder
annuity trusts, charitable remainder unitrusts, or pooled income funds.""
Perhaps these restrictions were more than offset by the increased overall limitation from 30 to 50 per cent on gifts to public charities."'
Ix
DEATH AND BIRTH RATES OF FOUNDATIONS

There is strong evidence that many

private foundations have

simply

elected to liquidate rather than go through the trials, tribulations and costs of
compliance with the 1969 Act. Commissioner Alexander reported in a letter
to the Senate Subcommittee on Foundations on October 2, 1974 that 4,892
non-operating private foundations had terminated their status since the effective date of the 1969 Act." 2 This represents approximately 15 per cent of all
of the private non-operating foundations in existence when the 1969 Act was
enacted."13 Professor John Simon of the Yale Law School has noted that,
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§ 170(e)(1)(B)(ii).
§§ 170(b)(1)(A), (B); see note 18 supra.
§§ 508, 509, 4940-48.

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
COUNCIL REPORT 111-25.
Labovitz 102; COUNCIL REPORT II-23b.
COUNCIL REPORT table 14, quoting from F.

UNITED STATES: HISTORY AND STRUCTURE 9

109.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§

EMERSON ANDREWS, PHILANTHROPY

IN THE

(1973).

170(e)(1).

110. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(f)(2). Also see the restrictions in id. §§ 170(f)(3), (4).
Ill. Compare INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, ch. 1, § 170(b), 68A Stat. 58, as amended 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(b) (Supp. 1975) with INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(b).
112. See COUNCIL REPORT 111-22.
113.

COUNCIL REPORT 11-1.
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based on a count of new foundations recognized by the Internal Revenue
Service in a given period in 1969 before enactment of the new Act, and a
comparable period in 1973, less than half as many new private foundations
were established in 1973 as in 1969."' He also noted that a similar count
showed more than three times as many foundations being terminated in 1973
than in a comparable period of 1969.15 Perhaps even more disturbing is the
Foundation Center's analysis of the establishment and dissolution of foundations in a twelve-state area; these figures show that in 1968 1,228 new foundations were established and only seventy-one dissolved, whereas in 1972, 128
were established and 605 dissolved.'" 6 Hopefully, most of the organizations
which are unable, or simply unwilling, to comply with the 1969 Act have now
been dissolved, so that the number of dissolutions in the future will decline.
Nevertheless, the decline must be very striking to avoid all alarm.
X
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

Prior to 1969, compliance by exempt organizations "had a relatively low
order of priority" in the planning of the Internal Revenue Service.' 17 Audits
of exempt organizations produced very little revenue-only five million dollars out of total tax revenues of almost two hundred billion dollars1 1 -and
there was reluctance to devote limited resources to such a poor measurable
result. This attitude ignored the danger of widespread abuse of claims to
tax-exempt status contrary to the public interest and the responsibility placed
on the Internal Revenue Service as the only agency of the Federal Government empowered to prevent such abuse. Even prior to final enactment of the
1969 Act, Commissioner Randolph Thrower recognized the need for a more
active program to insure compliance by organizations claiming tax exemption
under the statute. He directed that exempt organization compliance activities
be concentrated in fifteen "key districts" located throughout the country and
staffed with agents specially trained in the exempt organization area.11 9
Shortly thereafter, an Exempt Organizations Branch was created in the National Office Audit Division under the supervison of the Assistant Commissioner (Compliance) for the sole purpose of directing and overseeing the
audit of exempt organizations. The number of employees assigned to such
114. Hearings, supra note 8, at 174-75, summarized in COUNCIL REPORT example 11.
115. Id.
116. COUNCIL REPORT III-23a, chart 2.
117. Address by Commissioner Thrower, Tax Executives' Institute in New York City, Sept.
21, 1970.
118. Address by Commissioner Thrower, American University Conference on Non-Profit Organizations in Washington, D.C., Feb. 18, 1971.
119. Address by Commissioner Thrower, California CPA Society 1969 Tax Accounting Conference in Los Angeles, Nov. 11, 1969.
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audit activities nationwide increased from 263 in 1968 to 344 in 1970, and to
644 in 1972. In addition, the Exempt Organizations Branch in the National
Office Tax Rulings Division under the supervision of the Assistant Commissioner (Technical) was increased from eighty employees in 1968 to 131 in
197 1.1211 Implementing this program was not without difficulty. As later explained by Commissioner Walters, IRS "agents usually are accountants,
trained and oriented toward auditing complex books in search of items of
revenue for the Government."' 1 2' It is difficult sometimes for them to "grasp
the subtleties of the law of charities, trust law, and the deeper philosophical
implications of the Government's duty to help the private sector promote the
public good through a wide range of imaginative and innovative
programs."'122 They need at times to be "lawyers, philosophers, scientists,
1
theologians and, of course, these they are not." 23
There was also established in 1969, prior to final enactment of the Tax
Reform Act, a Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Exempt Organizations,
headed by a former Under Secretary of the Treasury and" composed of fifteen men and women from throughout the country prominent in a broad
range of disciplines, such as philosophy, theology, education, the physical sciences, economics, business, law, and accounting.124 With this Committee the
Commissioner, the Chief Counsel, and members of their staffs met regularly
during the next several years to obtain guidance and suggestions with respect
to numerous exempt organization problems-both substantive and procedural. During this period, the Service was faced with the especially difficult
question of determining the meaning and outside perimeters of the word
"charitable" as used in section 501(c)(3)-particularly in such areas as public
interest law firms, racially segregated private schools, imposition of minimum
charges by non-profit hospitals, and the financing of businesses for minority
groups. Regulations under the 1939 Code provided that corporations organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes comprise, in general,
organizations for the relief of the poor.'2 5 In 1959 the Regulations were
broadened to provide that the term "charitable" in section 501(c)(3) was to be
construed "in its generally accepted legal sense" and included "[r]elief of the
poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of education or science . ..lessening of the burdens of Government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to accom-

120.
121.
July 12,
122.
123.
124.
125.

Address
Address
1973.
Id.
id.
Address
See, e.g.,

by Commissioner Thrower, supra note 118.
by Commissioner Walters, Tax Exempt Organizations Institute in San Diego,

of Commissioner Thrower, supra note 119.
Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.101(6)-i (1943).
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plish any of the above purposes . . 26 And in more recent years the Service, following the law of trusts, has recognized that the term is not a static,
but a fluid one, as public needs and demands change.
Enactment of the 1969 Act necessitated intensified efforts on the part of
the Service to deal not only with these problems, but with the many new
concepts in that Act. Reference has already been made to some of the
troublesome problems of interpretation in the issuance of new regulations
called for by the Act. Especially difficult were the promulgation of regulations
dealing with community trusts, scholarship funds, charitable remainder annuities and unitrusts, and, accordingly, much of the time of the Regulations
Policy Committee-composed of the Commissioner, Assistant Secretary, Chief
Counsel and Assistant Commissioner (Technical)-was spent in 1970, 1971,
and 1972 struggling with these problems. The sheer volume of the new regulations required by the Act-aggregating several hundred pages-and the
urgent demands of charitable organizations, particularly private foundations,
to know as quickly as possible the position the Service would take in such
regulations accentuated the problem.12 7
In 1969, the Service also undertook to carry out the recommendation of
the Peterson Commission that every foundation be audited at least once in the
next three years. 28 Subsequently, a program was adopted to examine large
foundations on a two-year cycle, and all others on a five-year cycle ending no
later than December 31, 1974.121

From 1969 to 1972, the Exempt Organizations Branch under the Assistant
Commissioner (Technical) increased the number of advance rulings in exempt
organization matters from 1,400 to more than 3,200 and the number of technical advice letters to the field in exempt organization matters from 240 to
6l0. 3 °1 The latter is particularly significant because all requests for technical
advice are originated by audit personnel in the field, and these figures indicate that despite their greater sophistication in dealing with exempt organization matters, the number of audits they are undertaking require increasingly
greater advice from the National Office.
The attitude of the Service in conducting private foundation audits is of
particular significance. In 1970 a memorandum was distributed to Service
1
personnel stating: 13
126.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959).

127. During the fiscal year 1971, the Legislation and Regulations Division of the Office of the
Chief Counsel, working with representatives of the Assistant Commissioner (Technical) and the
Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, issued more entirely new regulations in proposed or final form

than had been issued in the prior five years, or in any single earlier year.
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These private foundation provisions must be interpreted and administered
in light of their special purpose and their individual structure as a group in
the Code. Their purpose is not to raise revenue; they are designed to act as a
guardian to insure that foundation assets will be put to charitable uses. In
interpreting and administering these provisions, a strict adversary position
should not automatically be taken. They call for an extraordinary degree of
care and judgment in their application. We should not assume that private
foundations are subject to a presumption of impropriety in their dealings or
that it is the role of the Treasury Department to discourage their existence.
Sanctions should be imposed only where appropriate and every effort
should be made to carry out the Congressional intent to benefit, rather than
impede, charity. Each factual situation must be examined on its own merits
and a threshold decision made whether it violates the basic intent and spirit of
the provisions. If it does not, then the purportedly charitable activity should
be allowed to continue, and we should not attempt to proscribe such activity
by creating formalistic, unworkable, or unreasonable rules, through strained
interpretations of the Code provisions.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 requires that the
responsibilities of the Internal Revenue Service in the Exempt Organizations
and Employee Plans areas be consolidated and coordinated by a new Assistant
Commissioner for Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations.13 2 Technical
and audit functions have been merged into this new office. The number of
key districts has been increased from the original fifteen to nineteen, and the
position of Assistant Regional Commissioner (Employee Plans and Exempt
Organizations) was created in each of the seven Internal Revenue regions
with the objective of giving greater emphasis and high level attention to Exempt Organization and Employee Plan matters and doing so in a more consis33
tent manner.'
All of these activities insure greater attention by the Internal Revenue Service to private foundations, and the necessity that they give closer attention to
the new requirements of the law and regulations. At the same time it seems
likely that with the added expertise there will probably be a more fair, evenhanded treatment of the problems of foundations under the law.
CONCLUSION

What is the message of all this? Unless there is some change in the statute,
it is quite evident that the private foundation movement has lost much of its
vitality. Not only is the birthrate down, but the deathrate now far exceeds the
birthrate; not only is the number of new gifts to existing foundations down,
but the size of the gifts is also down; not only is the source of funding diminished, but the cost of compliance with the new law has increased, and
unless foundations either find a better way to invest their money, or Congress

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7802(b).
133. Address by Alvin D. Lurie, Assistant Commissioner (EPEO), Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, in San Diego, Feb. 7, 1975.
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reduces the minimum rate of return expected of their investments, they will
be forced each year to deplete their capital-a capital which already, on account of inflation, is diminishing steadily in value.
134
The Council on Foundations concludes in its report that:
[T]he 1969 Act has done much to rid the field of abuses and stir many of
its members to a more conscious and more active sense of philanthropic obligation.
[Miost foundations have managed to learn to live with the new law, and
there is an informal consensus that it has, in fact, removed much of the potential for abuse and improved the responsiveness of the field to public needs
and interests.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the 1969 Act has also restricted the ability of
private foundations to assist in meeting the demands of society and unless
amended in some of the areas mentioned above, it will continue to do so.
Senator Hartke notes in his report that "[i]t is significant that the Subcommittee on Foundations has received only a handful of complaints suggesting
abuses on the part of foundations," and then concludes: "In our pluralistic
society, we should never depend on government alone to support research
and innovation. Foundations offer an alternative to that dependence, and-as
such-they should be welcomed and encouraged. ' 135 There are many provisions in the 1969 Act which serve the public good, but it is to be hoped that
Senator Hartke's admonition will be kept in mind by the Congress, and that
instead of continuing to "cut off the dog's tail an inch at a time,"1 36 it will do
all that can be done to restore the foundation movement to good health as a
vital part of American society.
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